Inevitably our dialogue has revolved around the problem of knowledge since the experience of poetry in its "resident" value is "rapt apprehension," a form of perception that, ideally, grasps a value and meaning "subsisting" in reality but brought into "existence" by the poet for our use in and through the literary work; whence, in a somewhat diluted form, it creates the "world" of our inadequate basis for moral theory, it lacks a cosmogony, as also a theory of the origin of culture; it is itself aprioristic, not empirical; it has no sense of mystery, is incapable of religious response; finally, for the naturalist, "person" is just a psychological term.
Again, if the problem of moral philosophy is to face the fundamental task of showing, in general terms, "how radical conflicts and perplexities could be resolved morally, naturalism with its value-free picture of the world could not do it" (p. 242). The effective alternative, he "knows," presented in the moral experience of humanity through many generations, is the recognition of "ontic" values, with their quality of "requiredness," and their demand for our "espousal." Without such "knowledge," how could "liberal" and "conservative," terms used in his polemics, be more for Alonzo than "value-free" terms, requiring nothing of anybody?
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To be sure Alonzo grants that certain species and varieties of "liberals," however strange, are bound to slip through his net. For Alonzo a "liberal," as he uses the term, is a "naturalist" or a fellow-traveler, sometimes unwittingly, of philosophical naturalism, applying its "methodology" or rather its "faith" to moral, educational, social, and especially to political problems. The reader should observe, however, that if for the young Alonzo "conservatives" had been plain "thugs," for Eliseo Vivas three or four types of "conservatives " who wield great power in finance and government still remain in that category.
